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ABSTRACT
There is a great variety of environmental financial reporting as
regards content, extension and how it is included in the annual
accounts. Spain and, in particular, the toll roads sector was
amongst the first to be required to disclose environmental infor-
mation. These concessionaires have also been affected by changes
in domestic and international accounting regulation.
The first objective of the paper is to analyse the quality of
environmental financial reporting in the Spanish toll roads sector
and its evolution after International Financial Reporting Standards
(IFRS) implementation. The second is to compare the reporting
behaviour of concessionaires with that of their parent companies.
The third is to test what institutional mechanisms influence envir-
onmental disclosure. Content analysis has been applied for the
period 1999–2015.
Results show a minimum environmental reporting level
focused merely on complying with regulation requirements, with-
out a useful content revealing the integration of environmental
issues into the companies’ management. The implementation of
IFRS has not improved environmental disclosure and, in some
cases, has even worsened it. In addition, under institutional theory,
results show that some institutional factors (regulation and sub-
sector) explain the environmental financial reporting behaviour of
the companies analysed.
ANÁLISIS DE LA INFORMACIÓN FINANCIERA
MEDIOAMBIENTAL EN EL SECTOR DE LAS
AUTOPISTAS DE PEAJE ESPAÑOLAS
RESUMEN
Hay una gran variedad de información financiera medioambiental
según su contenido, extensión y cómo se incluye en las cuentas
anuales. España y, en particular, el sector de las autopistas de peaje
han estado entre los primeros en exigir la revelación de información
medioambiental. Estas empresas concesionarias también se han visto
afectadas por cambios en la regulación contable nacional e
internacional.
El primer objetivo de este trabajo es analizar la calidad de la
información financiera medioambiental en el sector de las autop-
istas de peaje españolas y su evolución tras la implementación de
las Normas Internacionales de Información Financiera (NIIF). El
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segundo objetivo es comparar el comportamiento informativo de
las empresas concesionarias con el de sus empresas matriz. El
tercer objetivo consiste en verificar qué mecanismos institucio-
nales influyen en la revelación de información medioambiental.
El análisis de contenidos se ha aplicado al periodo 1999-2015. Los
resultados muestran un nivel de información medioambiental
mínimo que se limita a cumplir con los requisitos de la
regulación contable, sin unos contenidos suficientes que revelen
la integración de las cuestiones medioambientales en la gestión
de las empresas. La implementación de las NIIF tampoco ha
mejorado la revelación de información medioambiental y, en
algunos casos, incluso ha empeorado. Además, de acuerdo con
la teoría institucional, los resultados señalan que algunos factores
institucionales (la regulación y el sub-sector) explican el compor-
tamiento de las compañías analizadas respecto a la información
financiera medioambiental.
1. Introduction
The environmental impact of economic activities is, to a greater or lesser extent, on the
agendas of governments and major organisations all over the world (European Commission,
2014; United Nations, 1992). Concerns about climate change and biodiversity preservation
require great efforts from corporations to minimise the effects of their activities on the
environment. Echoing this issue, governments and international institutions have promoted
sustainable actions to preserve the planet.1 To reach the global objective of sustainability, the
focus relies on several productive sectors, because of their impact on environment.
Accountability and transparency are amongst the actions to control environmental sustain-
ability (Asociación Española de Contabilidad y Auditoría (AECA), 2004) and, as a result, the
elaboration and disclosure of environmental reporting, in both financial and non-financial
terms (Deegan, 2002; Larrinaga, Moneva, Llena, Carrasco, & Correa, 2002).
Accordingly, the disclosure of environmental reporting of companies has evolved
over time, increasing its quantity, and both voluntary and compulsory. But this increase
in quantity has not always been matched with higher levels of usefulness and quality of
information (Llena, Moneva, & Hernández, 2007). Usually, environmental information
included in financial statements corresponds to compulsory disclosures regulated by
accounting standards. This information is often focused on financial issues and tends to
be located in the notes to the annual accounts and in the management report
(PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), 2004).
Although all industries have an influence on environment, there are some of them
whose negative impact seems more clear, such as power, chemicals, construction and
transport and they have been the main focus of attention of governments and major
international organisations (Aerts & Cormier, 2009; Cho & Patten, 2007), by means of
environmental regulations and agreements.
Related to the construction and transport industries, the Spanish toll motorway
concessions sector is a major international player, given that five of the top ten
international toll motorway concession companies are from Spain (PWF-Public
Works Financing, 2017). The Spanish toll roads sector was amongst the first industries
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in disclosing environmental information about the activity of concessionaires with
a specific accounting regulation.
This sector has been affected by changes in accounting regulation: in 2005,
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) became compulsory for European
corporate groups and the IFRS’s framework and principles became indirectly compul-
sory for individual Spanish companies after the adaptation of the Spanish General
Accounting Plan (SGAP) to them, in 2007.
The sector is divided into two sub-sectors real and shadow toll roads, extending prior
research that was focused exclusively on real toll roads (Stafford, Acerete, & Stapleton,
2010). This extension is not only in the data, but also in the underlying philosophy that
Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) bring to the management of public infrastructure by
means of shadow toll concessions.
In addition, there has been a change in the shareholding structure of concessionaires,
from being dominated by public administrations to being controlled by building and
infrastructure management parent companies. The comparison of the disclosure of
environmental issues by individual concessionaires and by their parent companies has
not been analysed previously. This comparison also enables to compare domestic vs.
international environmental accounting requirements.
Aiming to reconcile the numerical data with theoretical views, we examine the
influence of some institutional mechanisms on the quality of environmental financial
reporting behaviour of Spanish toll sector entities, using the institutional theory to carry
out this analysis.
On the basis of the foregoing, the objective of the paper is threefold. First, to analyse
the quality of environmental financial reporting in the Spanish toll roads sector and its
evolution after IFRS implementation. Second, to compare the reporting behaviour of
concessionaires with their parent companies. Third, to explore which institutional
mechanisms affect environmental disclosures of Spanish toll roads.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief background of features
and evolution of toll roads sector in Spain and its environmental financial reporting.
Section 3 sets out the theoretical framework and hypothesis to carry out the analysis,
preceded by a review of literature on environmental financial reporting. Section 4
explains the methodology and research design. Section 5 presents the results. Section
6 discusses the results and Section 7 draws out the main conclusions.
2. Research framework
2.1. Features and evolution of toll road concessions in Spain
Spain was an early pioneer of private finance for real toll roads (Acerete, Gasca, &
Stafford, forthcoming; Villalba-Romero, 2014). In the 1960s, Spain’s government
sought to modernise transport infrastructure but, due to its economic isolation,
there was no public money available and the State turned to the private sector. In
the 1980s, this toll policy was abandoned when a socialist government, ideologically
opposed to using private finance, came to power. In addition, in 1986, when Spain
joined the EU, it became eligible to receive EU funds for road infrastructure, so
private finance was not needed. In 1996, Spain returned to the use of private finance
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to meet the convergence criteria (public deficit and public debt) for joining the
Economic and Monetary Union.
During these decades a devolution process from central government to regional
governments took place, and they tried to manage their road infrastructure needs using
private finance. But, despite Spain’s long experience with real toll roads, regional
governments tried to avoid the politically controversial problem of real tolling by
implementing shadow toll roads (Acerete et al., forthcoming).
Two phases can be differentiated in the period of analysis (1999–2015) regarding the
economic and sectoral context: (i) (1999–2007) with economic growth under the shelter
of the Economic and Monetary Union and the development of the last toll roads
projects; and (ii) (2008–2015) with the crisis which has resulted in a fall in economic
activity, several concessionaires entering into bankruptcy proceedings2 as a result of
poor traffic forecasts.
Concessions are a form of PPP3 that are a third way for governments to deliver
public services and to provide public infrastructure, such as roads.
One of the most outstanding features of PPP arrangements is the flexibility to use
out-of-the-box solutions to solve the challenges that arise in day-to-day operations. As
a result, PPP give operators the freedom to come up with innovative solutions for
a more effective and efficient delivery of services than conventional public procurement,
for instance, with respect to embedding environmental safeguards (Klijn, Edelenbos,
Kort, & van Twist, 2008).
PPP in the road sector consist of two types of concessions: real toll roads and shadow
toll roads. Both of them are contracts signed by the public administration with private
sector operators (concessionaires) to build, finance and operate roads. But, whereas real
toll roads give the concessionaires the right to charge vehicles to use the roads, shadow
toll roads are funded by taxpayers on the basis of the level of traffic using the roads
(Stafford et al., 2010).
Although the concept of PPP was implemented for the first time 25 years ago, real
toll road concessions date back to the late 1960s. The concession model found a new life
with PPP and the devising of shadow toll concessions. Shadow toll agreements incor-
porated the innovative philosophy of PPP, so they were supposed to be free from the
constraints of conventional public procurement, and environmental questions, amongst
other issues, could be more easily included as key matters that private operators should
consider when preparing their projects.
It is also relevant that, in the Spanish toll roads sector, there has been a consolidation
of individual concessionaire companies under the umbrella of big international con-
struction and infrastructure groups. So there is a duality in financial reporting in this
sector: individual concessionaires only need to comply with national accounting reg-
ulations because they are not listed on the stock market, but their parent companies are
listed on national and international stock exchanges, so they must present their
financial information according to IFRS.
2.2. Financial reporting regulation of Spanish toll roads sector
Spain was amongst the first countries that issued regulation on environmental account-
ing information (Fédération des Experts comptables Européens (FEE), 2008). In 1998,
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an amendment to the SGAP for the toll concession4 sector regulating the environmental
accounting reporting to be included in compulsory financial statements was issued.
This amendment included the requirements to disclose information – both financial
and non-financial – about the environmental impact of companies’ activities.
In 2002, the Spanish accounting regulator issued a Resolution5 extending the
requirement for disclosing environmental accounting information in financial state-
ments to all Spanish companies, regardless of the sector they belong to. Likewise, Law
62/2003 required companies to include environmental information in their manage-
ment reports from 2005 onward. Law 16/2007 about the adaptation of the accounting
regulations to the IFRS (art. 49 and 202) incorporated the requirements of the super-
seded regulation on environmental accounting reporting. These requirements made it
compulsory to include, in the notes to the financial statements, a note about the
recognition and measurement of assets and liabilities of an environmental nature and
another note about environmental information.
As regards corporate groups, Law 62/2003 made it compulsory to apply International
Accounting Standards passed by the European Commission to the consolidated finan-
cial statements of listed corporate groups from 2005 onward. But, as international
accounting standards do not regulate the disclosure of environmental information in
the notes to the financial statements, Spanish corporate groups have had to face the
dilemma of whether to disclose the corresponding environmental accounting issues
required by the SGAP, which were not unknown for them. This fact has led to a wide
variability in the way that corporate groups disclose environmental reporting in the
financial statements.
Directive 2013/34/EU on the annual financial statements, consolidated financial state-
ments and related reports of certain types of undertakings stated that the information
should not be restricted to the financial aspects of the undertaking’s business and that there
should be an analysis of environmental and social aspects of the business necessary for an
understanding of the undertaking’s development, performance or position. For this reason,
the management report must include information relating to environmental matters.
The European Commission amended Directive 2014/95/EU about the disclosure of
non-financial and diversity information by certain large undertakings and groups
because the Commission identified the need to raise the transparency of the social
and environmental information provided by undertakings in all sectors to a similarly
high level across all Member States (European Union, 2014). The European
Commission undertook this amendment as it considered that the disclosure of non-
financial information is vital for managing change towards a sustainable global econ-
omy by combining long-term profitability with social justice and environmental protec-
tion. In order to enhance the consistency and comparability of the non-financial
information disclosed throughout the EU, certain large undertakings6 should prepare
a non-financial statement, to be included in the management report, containing infor-
mation relating to at least environmental matters, social and employee-related matters
and, in particular, detailing the current and foreseeable impact of the undertaking’s
operations on the environment.
The draft of the Spanish law to implement the transposition of the Directives includes
their content completely, although this information is not the objective of this work as it has
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not been transposed yet. Nevertheless, it is going to provoke a change in the way financial
and non-financial environmental reporting is disclosed by large European undertakings.
3. Theoretical framework and hypotheses
3.1. Literature review
Environmental accounting reporting has been under the scrutiny of researchers for
many years. One of the first papers to measure the environmental disclosures in
financial statements was written by Wiseman (1982). Since then, there has been an
increase of international analysis on corporate environmental reporting. Different
approaches have been used in studies to analyse the corporate environmental reporting.
Several studies have analysed publicly-traded companies from different industries
(Archel, 2003; Barbu, Dumontier, Feleaga, & Feleaga, 2014; Campbell, 2004; Cormier,
Magnan, & Van Velthoven, 2005; Frost, 2007; Husillos, 2007; Moneva & Llena, 2000).
The main results show that disclosure is limited and narrative, but it is increasing its
presence. Furthermore, the sectors that are the most sensitive to social and environ-
mental issues seem to disclose more detailed information.
The enactment of mandatory CSR guidelines or environmental reporting is neces-
sary to reach a higher level of quality and quantity of environmental disclosure. Several
researchers have analysed the effect of the introduction of new regulations for this type
of reporting (Bebbington, Kirk, & Larrinaga, 2012; Frost, 2007; Larrinaga et al., 2002).
Larrinaga et al. (2002) carry out a research on Spanish regulation which requires the
Spanish companies to disclose financial environmental information in the financial state-
ments. Although mandatory environmental disclosure is considered a way to improve
accountability of companies, the low level of compliance shows that regulation is not enough
to improve environmental accountability. These authors conclude that to reach an effective
implementation of regulation, a discursive dialogue that enables the institutional reform is
necessary.
Llena et al. (2007) analyse a sample of large Spanish companies and the results
show a sharp increase of environmental reporting in the notes to the financial
statements, due to the new regulation arising from the EU’s Recommendation issued
in 2001. Frost (2007) and Senn (2018) obtain similar results about the increase of
environmental disclosure after the introduction of the regulation in Australia and
France, respectively, and discuss on normativity in a changing regulatory framework.
In addition, Llena et al. (2007) analyse some factors that influence the level of
information (stock exchange listing, belonging to regulated sectors, nationality of
the parent company, belonging to environmental sensitive sectors). Only belonging
to an environmental sensitive sector shows an influence on the level of environ-
mental disclosure.
Barbu et al. (2014) investigate the effects of adopting a single set of accounting
standards in a sample made up of large German, French and the United Kingdom listed
companies that are potentially concerned with environmental issues. They conclude
‘that environmental disclosures imposed by IFRSs increase with firm size, and that firms
domiciled in countries with constraining environmental disclosure regulations report
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more on environmental issues than firms domiciled in countries with weakly constraining
regulations’ (Barbu et al., 2014, p. 231).
Bebbington et al. (2012) analyse the production of normativity comparing two
different reporting regimes such as Spain and the United Kingdom. They suggest that
the success in applying regulation does not only depend on authority, but on char-
acteristics and procedures for creating the regulation. They conclude that ‘the internal
legitimacy of the law is crucial in the construction of normativity’ (Bebbington et al.,
2012, p. 78). The analysis is focused in three aspects that determine the success on the
observance of the regulations: congruence with the underlying values, integration of the
rules in a coherent framework and clarity provided by rules. This constructivist
approach of law takes into account both regulatees and the capacity of influence of
other agents, such as auditors.
Chauvey, Giordano-Spring, Cho, and Patten (2015) analyse the evolution of CSR
reporting in French companies given the concept of normativity proposed by
Bebbington et al. (2012). Results show that CSR disclosure has increased in terms of
space and breadth, indicating an evolution to a greater normativity of regulations.
Nevertheless, reporting does not reach a quality level that allows complying with the
goal of transparency set up by regulations.
Based on the institutional theory, García Sánchez, Prado, and Frías (2013) analyse
the influence of countries’ legal system on corporate transparency and its relationship
with sustainability. This study concludes that the national legal system as institutional
factor has a direct influence on the sustainability reporting.
Aranguren (2016) studies the disclosure of environmental and social reporting of big
publicly traded German, British and Spanish companies. She analyses the reporting
behaviour and the institutional factors that affect each type of reporting. She finds
differences between the British companies and the German and Spanish firms.
Institutional pressures at societal level influence corporate reporting on community
and ethical issues, but do not influence reporting on employee and environmental
issues. Institutional factors at organisational level, such as industry sector and country,
affect environmental reporting, but cancel each other out.
Other studies have explored the environmental disclosure of key items in environ-
mentally sensitive sectors such as oil gas, chemical, electricity, forestry (Acerete, Llena,
& Moneva, 2011; Deegan & Gordon, 1996; Frost & Wilmshurst, 2000; Larrinaga et al.,
2002; Llena et al., 2007), and even in industries that seem to be far from having an
impact on environment such as financial and insurance services.
However, there have been few works that have analysed companies belonging to
public infrastructure concessions, especially in the toll roads or construction sectors
(Acerete et al., 2011). Our study is focused on the analysis of the disclosure of
environmental reporting issues in the financial statements, as it is one of the most
relevant fields of study (see Alin, 2006; Bartolomeo, Bouma, Heydkamp, James, &
Wolters, 2000; Gamble, Hsu, Jackson, & Tollerson, 1996; Harte & Owen, 1991;
Holland & Foo, 2003; Yusoff, Othman, & Yatim, 2013), and on the coercive institu-
tional factors that determine the environmental reporting behaviour (Bebbington et al.,
2012; Higgins & Larrinaga, 2014).
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3.2. Theory and hypothesis
The environmental information included in financial statements usually corresponds to
compulsory disclosures regulated by accounting standards. This information is often focused
on financial issues and there is little opportunity for manipulation. Financial statements are
audited in large companies, so it is more difficult for the company to manipulate them.
Typically, financial environmental disclosures are located in the notes to the annual accounts
and in the management report (PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), 2004).
The environmental reporting corresponding to mandatory disclosures that is
included in the financial statements seems to be governed by one of the systems-
oriented financial accounting theories: the institutional theory. Authors such as
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and Campbell (2007) state that social and environ-
mental responsible behaviour can be explained from the institutional theory’s
approach. In this way, transparency and sustainability reporting are matters linked
with a socially responsible behaviour (Asociación Española de Contabilidad
y Auditoría (AECA), 2004).
The institutional theory focuses on the interaction between an organisation and its
institutional environment (Scott, 1995/2013). According to this framework, organisa-
tions change their structure or operations to meet external expectations about what
structures are acceptable or legitimate. Furthermore, organisations try to comply with
regulations by disclosing only what is required or they tend to imitate the behaviour of
other pioneering and successful entities (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).
Several authors have analysed the institutional features that determine a socially
responsible corporate behaviour (Campbell, 2007; Higgins & Larrinaga, 2014; Scott,
1995/2013). These features or mechanisms can be grouped into three categories: (i)
coercive, (ii) normative mechanisms and (iii) mimetic mechanisms (DiMaggio &
Powell, 1983). The level and extent of mandatory environmental financial reporting
of the toll roads sector could be the consequence of some changes in the institutional
mechanisms: new accounting regulation, ownership concentration or organisational
changes in the sector (Higgins & Larrinaga, 2014; Scott, 1995/2013).
3.3. Coercive and normative mechanisms
Coercive and normative mechanisms are those that establish some modus operandi that
cannot be avoided because they are compulsory due to the power of the entity that
promotes them (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). These mechanisms include government
regulation and the forms of action enforced by the parent company, auditors or other
professional associations that have an influence on companies (Scott, 1995/2013).
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) named institutional isomorphism the homogenisation
of the behaviour or the structure of organisations under three categories: coercive,
normative and mimetic. Coercive isomorphism arises from ‘pressures from other orga-
nisations upon which they are dependent and by cultural expectations of society’
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 150). These pressures come from governmental mandates
(e.g. environmental regulation), legal and technical requirements to receive public funds
or contracts (e.g. financial reporting requirements, annual reports, amongst others).
Normative isomorphism emerges from professionalisation. Isomorphic mechanisms
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include formal education by universities and other institutions, like professional bodies,
that expand their norms and standards to their members.
Campbell (2007) classifies the factors that may affect the level to which companies
act in a socially responsible way into two basic categories:
● Economic conditions: financial performance, level of competition.
● Institutional conditions: state regulations; private associations guidelines; member-
ship in associations, trade unions, employees, community groups and other sta-
keholders that promote socially responsible behaviour.
Scott (1995/2013) considers three types of features (the so-called ‘three pillars of
institutions’) to explain the differences of organisations’ behaviour: regulative, norma-
tive and cultural-cognitive systems. Based on Scott’s (1995/2013) proposal, Higgins and
Larrinaga (2014, p. 276) state that:
‘Sustainability reporting would consist of regulative, normative and cognitive structures and
activities which would describe what type of reporting is produced, for who, by whom and
with what assumed purpose’.
The regulative pillar is based on legislation and experience is the basis of compliance.
The indicators used are rules, laws and sanctions, and correspond with coercive
mechanisms introduced by DiMaggio and Powell (1983). The normative pillar bases
the compliance of organisations on a social contract generated by expectations about
their behaviour. Indicators such as accreditation and certification are used in this
normative approach.
3.4. Mimetic mechanisms
Mimetic mechanisms come from the concept of mimetic isomorphism proposed by
DiMaggio and Powell (1983). Mimetic processes arise from the uncertainty that moves
organisations to imitate structures and behaviour of peers because they accept that is
beneficial.
Scott, 2005, 1995/2013) states cultural-mimetic mechanisms as the third pillar of
organisations’ behaviour. This pillar is cultural-cognitive, based on mimetic mechan-
isms, and with elements such as common beliefs, isomorphism and shared logics of
action. Some cultural factors can affect the reporting behaviour about environmental
issues of the entities analysed. Belonging to an industry sector, or to a particular branch
thereof, can be considered as a characteristic that affects the behaviour of these firms
since, due to reputation-based reasons, none of them would be willing to show a poor
image by omitting information disclosed by the rest of the firms. A different reporting
culture, seniority and the environmental sensitivity of the sector can give rise to
different disclosing behaviour (Archel, 2003; Criado, Fernández, Husillos, &
Larrinaga, 2008; Larrinaga et al., 2002; Llena et al., 2007).
It must be noted that, according to Scott, 2005), the frontier between different types
of institutional mechanisms and structures is not always clearly defined. Sometimes,
some mechanisms could be considered coercive, being normative at the same time, or
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mimetic, being also coercive, for example belonging to an industry sector or the
influence of the parent company.
To set the limits of the research, and due to the relevance of regulations in CSR
research, it has focused on coercive mechanisms with different levels of coercion that
could determine the socially responsible corporate behaviour.
The following coercive mechanisms have been checked: (i) the incidence of regula-
tions; (ii) the influence of parent companies; (iii) the guidance of the auditing firm and
(iv) the industrial sector in which the company operates.
Government environmental financial reporting regulation is compulsory, so it can
produce a change in companies’ disclosure (Llena et al., 2007). In the same way, action
procedures imposed by parent companies are an element that can influence the
environmental reporting behaviour of their subsidiaries. Auditing firms have
a demanding reporting reputation, so their advisory activity can be a relevant factor
to take into account when environmental financial reporting is disclosed.
According to previous reasoning and under coercive mechanisms of institutional
theory, we test the following hypotheses:
H1: The change in environmental regulation is an institutional feature that has an
influence on reporting behaviour about environmental financial issues
H1.1: It has an influence on the behaviour of real toll concessionaires.
H1.2: It has an influence on the behaviour of shadow toll concessionaires.
H2: Parent company has an influence on reporting behaviour about environmental
financial issues
H3: Auditing firm has an influence on reporting behaviour about environmental
financial issues
H4: The type of subsector or concession (real tolls vs. shadow tolls) has an influence
on reporting behaviour about environmental financial issues
H5: The institutional shareholders of concessionaires have an influence on reporting
behaviour about environmental financial issues
4. Research design
4.1. Sample
The sample includes twenty-four Spanish real toll concessionaires (see Table A.1 in
the Appendix) and twenty-six Spanish shadow-toll concessionaires (see Table A.2 in
the Appendix), together represent 92% of the Spanish concessionaires. Table A.3
in the Appendix presents the main features of the real and shadow toll
concessionaires.
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The information analysed covers the period from 1999, the first year in which
environmental financial reporting became mandatory, to 2014/2015, the last year for
which the financial statements of the shadow/real toll roads concessionaires, respec-
tively, were available at the time this study was conducted.
Individual concessionaires are controlled by huge construction and management
infrastructure corporations, such as, SACYR, FCC, ACS, ABERTIS, OHL, ACCIONA,
FERROVIAL (see Table A.4 in the Appendix). These corporations are the ultimate
parent company for all the individual concessionaires of the sample above, except two
real toll concessions (AUSUR and MADRID-TOLEDO) and two shadow toll conces-
sions (ACCESOSIBIZA and SALNES).
4.2. Methods
We analysed the environmental accounting information included in the financial
statements of the concessionaires and their parent companies using the content analysis
method. This technique has been frequently and successfully used by the literature
dealing with environmental and social reporting (Acerete et al., 2011; Moneva & Llena,
2000; Tilt, 2001).
The environmental accounting information analysed is based on the items required
by the 2007 SGAP to be disclosed in the notes to the financial statements. Basically,
these items remain the same throughout the three different regulations that have been
applied in Spain (amendment to SGAP in 1998, 2002 Resolution and 2007 SGAP), so
the information collected is homogenous. The fourteen environmental items analysed
for the concessionaires and parent companies are listed in Table 1.
These items have been checked for the individual real toll and shadow toll
concessionaires, because they must apply the SGAP, and for the consolidated finan-
cial statements issued by the parent companies that are the head of the corporate
group that the individual concessionaires belong to. Although parent companies
must disclose the consolidated information according to the IFRS and environmental
information is not required by them, their head office is domiciled in Spain and they
are familiar with Spanish regulation because they have to elaborate their individual
Table 1. List of environmental items.
Note about accounting criteria
Note about environmental issues
Description of environmental assets
Measurement of environmental assets
Amortisation of environmental assets
Annual environmental investment
Environmental expenditures
Description of environmental provisions
Measurement of environmental provisions
Transfer to environmental provisions
Application of environmental provisions
Environmental contingencies
Environmental liabilities
Environmental information in the management report
Note: environmental items analysed for the concessionaires and
parent companies
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financial statements following the SGAP. To check the level of disclosure of envir-
onmental information, we have also assessed the environmental items included in
the individual financial statements of the parent companies, as they must comply
with the SGAP. This will also allow comparing both domestic and IFRS environ-
mental accounting requirements.
First we calculate the ‘Environmental Disclosure Index’ (EDI) proposed by Acerete
et al. (2011) for each corporation for each year of the sample period, distinguishing
between the two sub-sectors and the corresponding parent companies. Each environ-
mental reporting item is scored with ‘1’ if the item was reported in the notes to the
financial statements and ‘0’ if it was not. If there is no information available about an
item but it is specifically mentioned in the notes to the financial statements, it is scored
‘0.5’. The index is calculated by adding the scores of each item and dividing the sum by
the maximum number of items (14), so the index is expressed on a 100-point basis.
EDIit ¼
PX
j¼1
Xj
n
" 100
EDIit: Environmental Disclosure Index of corporation ‘i’ in year ‘t’
Xj: Presence of environmental reporting item ‘j’ in the notes
n: Maximum number of items
This index allows assessing the environmental financial reporting of the concessio-
naires, but not the evolution of each sub-sector (real toll roads, shadow toll roads,
parent companies). Hence, a ‘Sectoral Environmental Disclosure Index’ (SEDI) for
each year of the sample has been calculated by adding up the EDI of the concessionaires
and dividing the sum by the number of concessionaires in that year:
SEDIt¼
PZ
i¼1
EDIi
Zt
SEDIt: Sectoral Environmental Disclosure Index for year ‘t’
i: Concessionaire ‘i’
Zt: Number of concessionaires in year ‘t’
Note that not all concessionaires have operated during all the years of the sample. In
addition, although the parent companies are large companies that were founded several
decades ago, their environmental accounting reporting has been measured since
the year that the first concession controlled by them was opened to traffic (see ‘Year
opening to traffic’ column in Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix). The number of
concessionaires for each year of the sample period is shown on Table 2.
Finally, we calculate an index to analyse the Overall Disclosure of Environmental
Items (ODEI) in each sub-sector, distinguishing between concessionaires and parent
companies. The ODEI is calculated similarly to the EDI, adding up the scores of each
item (‘1’, ‘0’ or ‘0.5’) for all the corporations of the sample in each year and dividing by
the number of operating corporations. In this way, the results of all the years of the
12 B. ACERETE ET AL.
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sample are added and the sum is divided by the number of years of the sample. The
index is also expressed on a 100-point basis:
ODEIXj ¼
PZ;T
i;t¼1
EDIit
T
" 100
Xj: Environmental reporting item “j” analysed
i, t: Corporation (concessionaire, parent company)
T: 17 for real toll roads; 13 for shadow toll roads
Statistical analysis has been applied in order to check the homogeneity in the level of
environmental reporting presented between concessionaires of the same sub-sector and
between concessionaires from both. To do so Multidimensional Scaling analysis (MDS)
and cluster analysis have been applied. The combination of both techniques is devoted
to the identification of homogeneous groups from the wide sample of companies under
study. The reason for applying these statistical techniques is to explore the homogeneity
of the Spanish toll roads sector when discloses environmental reporting. This analysis
covers both individual concessionaires and parent companies. The homogeneity of
environmental reporting behaviour of individual concessionaires is analysed and, also,
with respect to their parent companies.
In addition, non-parametric statistical tests have been applied to find the institutional
factors that affect the environmental financing reporting of the Spanish toll roads sector.
To do so, we apply the Wilcoxon test, the Mann-Whitney test and the Kruskal-Wallis test.
5. Analysis of results
To accomplish the objectives of this paper, we have applied the methods described
above, obtaining the following results.
5.1. Analysis of the quality of environmental disclosure in the Spanish toll roads
sector
5.1.1. Overall Disclosure of Environmental Items (ODEI)
If we focus on the ODEI of individual concessionaires and parent companies of the two
sub-sectors (see Table 3), the results are very poor because the ‘Average ODEI’ of all of
them ranges between 20 and 30. In both sub-sectors, the items with the highest scores
are the disclosure of the note about the accounting criteria and of the note about
environmental issues. Parent companies presenting SGAP-based financial statements
are the exception because they disclose more information specifically about environ-
mental expenditures in them than in the disclosure of the note about environmental
issues.
Nevertheless, the content of the note about the environmental issues is scarce. In real
toll individual concessionaires, only one of the environmental issues presents a score
close to 60 (environmental expenditures). The next item with the highest score (descrip-
tion of environmental provisions) does not reach 35 and more than a third of the
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remaining items score between 0 and 10. In the shadow toll individual concessionaires,
environmental expenditures is also the item with the highest score (40), two thirds of the
items do not score 10, and one third scores 0.
Only in a third of the items, individual toll road concessionaires reach better results
than parent companies. The consolidated financial statements issued by the parent
companies of shadow toll concessionaires achieve the highest value of ODEI and the
top scores of ODEI in half of the items. It can also be noted that the consolidated IFRS-
based financial statements presented by the parent companies get a higher ODEI than
the SGAP-based consolidated and individual financial statements.
Shadow toll individual concessionaires get worse scores than real toll individual
concessionaires. On the contrary, the shadow toll parent companies get better scores
when presenting environmental information according to IFRS or SGAP, than real toll
parent companies (see Table 3).
5.1.2. Sectoral Environmental Disclosure Index (SEDI)
As can be seen in Figure 1, the evolution of environmental disclosure in the real toll
sub-sector shows two different phases: first, an increase in the content of reporting until
2003; second, after 2003, SEDI came to a standstill. This figure also shows that the
maximum score of the SEDI is 35 and in most years the scores are between 20 and 30,
with a starting point below 20 for individual concessionaires and below 10 for parent
companies.
In the case of the shadow toll sub-sector (see Figure 2), the most outstanding feature is
that SEDI maintains the same level during most of the sample period, even with a slight
decrease as years go by, the final value of SEDI being lower than the initial value.
In both sub-sectors, before IFRS came into force, the SEDI of IFRS-based financial
statements of parent companies were increasing. But, after IFRS became compulsory
for the European corporate groups, environmental reporting came to stagnation.
Before 2002, the SGAP-based financial statements of real toll parent companies
Table 3. Overall Disclosure of Environmental Items (ODEI).
REAL TOLL ROADS SHADOW TOLL ROADS
Concessionaires
Parent
companies Concessionaires
Parent
companies
ITEMS SGAP SGAP IFRS SGAP SGAP IFRS
Note about accounting criteria 76.3 58.2 43.5 69.1 67.1 53.1
Note about environmental issues 89.2 38.6 73.5 87.4 39.1 79.2
Description of environmental assets 13.8 20.1 15.8 5.3 25.6 24.0
Measurement of environmental assets 15.5 22.9 32.0 11.9 26.2 43.5
Amortisation of environmental assets 2.2 15.4 14.4 0.0 17.6 13.1
Annual environmental investment 24.2 0.0 21.2 6.8 0.0 27.5
Environmental expenditures 58.0 48.3 37.0 40.4 47.2 40.1
Description of environmental provisions 34.0 29.6 38.2 31.0 36.1 43.3
Measurement of environmental provisions 0.8 0.0 17.8 0.0 0.0 13.1
Transfer to environmental provisions 3.3 0.0 10.8 0.0 0.0 13.1
Application of environmental provisions 0.0 0.0 13.9 0.0 0.0 13.1
Environmental contingencies 14.2 22.2 2.3 28.7 27.4 8.7
Environmental liabilities 1.6 0.0 0.0 4.9 0.0 0.0
Environm. information in the management report 29.8 20.1 20.6 6.3 32.1 36.2
AVERAGE ODEI 25.9 19.7 24.4 20.8 22.7 29.1
Note: Score of ODEI of each group of firms for each environmental item analysed
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increased their scores and, after 2002, they also came to stagnation. The information
disclosed by the SGAP-based financial statements of shadow toll parent companies
has maintained the same scores throughout the sample period and they have even
decreased slightly (see Figures 1 and 2).
Comparing the SEDI of individual real toll and shadow toll concessionaires, during
the whole sample, except the first year shadow toll concessions were opened to traffic,
real toll concessionaires reach better scores, with a difference of 22% on average (see
Figure 3). In addition, since IFRS were implemented in 2005, both sub-sectors follow
a similar path maintaining similar scores of SEDI to the ones reached in 2008, with
a slight increase in the real toll sub-sector and a slight decrease in the shadow toll sub-
sector, in the last years.
Concessionaires -
20.8
Parent companies 
(IFRS) - 29.1
Parent companies 
(SGAP) - 22.7
0
10
20
30
40
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
SEDI
Year
Figure 2. Evolution of SEDI of Shadow Toll Concessionaires and Parent Companies.
Concessionaires -
25.9
Parent companies 
(IFRS) - 24.4
Parent companies 
(SGAP) - 19.7
0
10
20
30
40
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
SEDI
Year
Figure 1. Evolution of SEDI of Real Toll Concessionaires and Parent concessionaires.
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In the first years of the sample, real toll concessionaires’ SEDI show an increase, but
it does not happen with the shadow toll concessionaires, because real tolls were much
older than shadow tolls and they increased the information disclosed as time went by.
5.2. Comparison of the reporting behaviour of individual concessionaires with
respect to their parent companies
Applying the MDS and cluster analysis to the EDI of toll road concessionaires and their
parent companies, we can identify four groups (see Figure 4):
● Group ‘1’ is made up of two individual concessionaires and two parent companies, with
the highest EDI (between 39 and 49 points). Surprisingly, the parent companies in this
group are not the ones that control the individual concessionaires that are in this group.
● Group ‘2’ includes eleven entities, most of the oldest concessionaires and just one
parent company. All the individual concessionaires controlled by SACYR are
found in this group. All these corporations show intermediate values of EDI
(between 23 and 35 points).
● Group ‘3’ includes eight corporations with similar scores of EDI to the previous
group (between 19 and 33 points) but, in this case, they were not in operation
since the beginning of the sample period.
● Group ‘4’ includes the five individual concessionaires and the two parent compa-
nies with the lowest EDI scores (between 6 and 15 points).
In the case of the shadow toll sub-sector, the statistical analysis produces the following
results (see Figure 5):
ST - 20.8
RT - 25.9
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
EDI
Year
Figure 3. Comparison of evolution of EDI between Shadow Toll and Real Toll concessionaires.
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● Group ‘1’ is made up of only parent companies that follow IFRS to elaborate their
consolidated financial statements, with the highest scores of EDI (between 33 and 57)
● Group ‘2’ is made up of the four oldest shadow toll concessionaires in Spain plus one
parent company with intermediate scores of EDI (between 15 and 22). Since 2002, these
concessionaires have maintained the same score of EDI or it has diminished
● Group ‘3’ is the largest cluster, containing more than half of the corporations of
the sample (14) with scores between 14 and 27 and it is only made up of individual
concessionaires, most of them opened to traffic in 2007 and 2008, and they have
maintained the same score of EDI for all the years.
● Group ‘4’ includes the corporations with the worst EDI, for instance OHL scores
‘0’ all the years of the sample, and they are the most recent concessions to be
opened to traffic.
5.3. Influence of institutional mechanisms on environmental disclosure
5.3.1. Normative mechanisms
To test whether new regulation on environmental financial reporting has a significant
influence on the reporting policy of companies, a non-parametric test is applied,
Figure 4. MDS of real toll concessionaires and parent companies.
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comparing values for two consecutive years. Applying this statistical technique, we can
detect if this institutional factor has an influence on the EDI.
The Wilcoxon test shows significant differences between consecutive years of the envir-
onmental financial reporting (EDI) for the years 2004–2005 and 2006–2007 (see Table 4).
Note that the IFRS became compulsory for European corporate groups in 2005. In 2007, the
new IFRS-based SGAP came into force, although its environmental requirements were
already set up in 2002, but no changes in the environmental disclosure are observed.
If we consider only real toll concessionaires, we can observe that, for 2002–2003,
2004–2005 and 2006–2007, there is evidence for not accepting null hypothesis of equality
of reporting behaviour. However, during the years when there is no regulatory change,
there is no evidence of change in environmental reporting behaviour. Therefore, there is
enough certainty to accept hypothesis H1.1 (see Table 4), because the test only shows
statistically significant differences in the years with new regulations. So, regulation on
environmental financial disclosure is an institutional factor with influence on the reporting
behaviour on environmental finance issues of real toll road concessionaires.
Nevertheless, in the case of shadow toll concessionaires, in any year of the sample,
results of Wilcoxon test cannot reject null hypothesis of behaviour equality and
hypothesis H1.2 cannot be accepted. The different reporting behaviour between the
two sub-sectors must be explained with further statistical analyses that help to explain
the influence of other factors.
Figure 5. MDS of shadow toll concessionaires and parent companies.
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The Kruskal-Wallis test shows that H2 cannot be accepted for all the period
analysed, except the last two years in which null hypothesis cannot be accepted.
Nevertheless, for the last years analysed, there is some evidence of different behaviour
depending on the parent company. So, the parent company could be an institutional
factor with influence on the reporting behaviour (see Table 5).
The third coercive institutional factor that has been considered as having an influ-
ence on the disclosing of environmental financial reporting by concessionaires is the
auditing firm. It has been found that the note to the financial statements about
environmental issues is exactly the same for companies audited by the same auditing
firm. However, the Kruskal-Wallis test applied to see whether if the auditing firm
influences the reporting behaviour of companies concludes that this is not
a significant factor until 2007 but that it is statically significant from 2008 on, when
the sample of companies analysed is bigger. So, for the period until 2007 null hypothesis
cannot be rejected, and from 2008 on, null hypothesis cannot be accepted so there is
enough evidence that auditing firms seem to have an influence on the reporting
behaviour (H3) (see Table 5).
As regards the type of concession, the Mann-Whitney non-parametric test concludes
that all the years of the sample period but two show significant differences in the
reporting behaviour between real toll and shadow toll concessionaires. Null hypothesis
cannot be accepted, so there is enough evidence for accepting H4. This result means
that the type of concession is an institutional factor that influences the reporting
behaviour. So, a different reporting behaviour between sub-sectors can arise from the
distinctive characteristics of the type of concession (ownership, age, type of manage-
ment, etc.), and companies within each sub-sector follow a common path, confirming
a mimetic isomorphism (see Table 6).
The coercive or mimetic isomorphism mechanisms could be established by the
reporting policy of the parent company of the individual concessionaires. Parent
companies might impose (coercive) or serve as a model (mimetic) for the subsidiaries.
The non-parametric Mann-Whitney and Kruskal-Wallis tests have been applied to test
this hypothesis, but no significantly different behaviours have been observed, neither
the type of ownership (public-private), nor the parent company.
Nevertheless, as occurred with the appearance of new regulation, there is
a significant reporting change between 2002 and 2003, when there was a change from
public to private ownership (see Table 7). The Mann-Whitney test (applied to the years
in which the ownership is distributed between public and private, i.e. until 2003) does
not allow us to reject the null hypothesis similarity between companies controlled by
public administrations and those controlled by private owners (significance 0.05). The
linear correlations between the year-based EDI and the type of ownership confirm that
there is no dependence between the reporting behaviour and the ownership of the
concessionaires, so hypothesis H5 cannot be accepted.
6. Discussion
In spite of the increase in environmental disclosures in the financial statements, results
show a limited corporate implication in environmental issues because their attitude is
little more than ‘box ticking’. Moreover, there is a shortage of financial data on some
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important issues such as environmental provisions and investments. Preliminary ana-
lysis shows a behaviour aligned with institutional theory’s principles, for instance,
a mimicking practise is observed, when concessionaires use the same or very similar
wording of paragraphs for disclosing the environmental issues in different years or in
the financial statements of different concessionaires.
There is a contradiction as several parent companies alleged that ‘in view of their
nature, the company’s activities did not have a significant environmental impact’, but in
the note to the financial statements about ‘company’s activities’, they state its corporate
purpose had an environmental impact, because it comprises ‘the business of constructing
all kinds of public and private works, as well as the provision of services, for the
conservation, maintenance and operation of motorways, freeways, roads and, in general
any type of public or private ways and any other type of works, and any kind of
industrial, commercial and financial actions and operations which bear a direct or
indirect relationship thereto’.
In addition, in the note about Accounting policies and measurement basis, both
individual concessionaires and parent companies describe how provisions, expenditures
and other environmental issues have to be accounted for, but most of the concessio-
naires do not include a specific breakdown in the notes to the financial statements
regarding environmental issues, because the concessionaire states that does not have
any environmental obligations, expenses, assets, liabilities or contingencies that might
be material.
Three facts are important in the evolution of the level of disclosure of environ-
mental information. The first was the implementation of the Adaptation of the SGAP
in 1998, which was the milestone for these companies because they did not pre-
viously disclose any environmental issues in their financial statements (Larrinaga
et al., 2002). The second was the implementation of the 2002 ICAC Resolution,
which introduced a comprehensive framework for environmental reporting for
Spanish companies and led concessionaries to increase their disclosures and to
follow a similar reporting behaviour to other companies with environmental impact,
such as electricity companies (Llena et al., 2007). This fact seems to deal with both
mimetic mechanisms stated by the institutional theory. Nevertheless, Spanish envir-
onmental accounting regulation for the toll motorways sector was not fully intro-
duced into the financial statements until 2003, some years after it should have been.
Similar delays in the application of environmental accounting requirements were
reported in surveys by Deloitte and Touche (2000)7; PwC (2004).8 Besides, the
volume of information disclosed to comply with the requirements has poor quality
and does not include detailed quantitative and qualitative information (e.g. there is
an insufficient description of environmental equipment). The third important fact
Table 7. Mann-Whitney test.
1999-EDI 2000-EDI 2001-EDI 2002-EDI 2003-EDI
U de Mann-Whitney 15.500 16.500 12.500 26.500 14.500
Z −.409 −.245 −.898 −.390 −.084
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.68 0.80 0.36 0.69 0.93
Pearson Coef 0.115 0.000 −0.357 −0.057 −0.036
Note: Mann-Whitney test results comparing public and private ownership)
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was that, when the new SGAP came into force in 2008, the environmental informa-
tion disclosed by individual concessionaires came to a standstill and something
similar happened to the consolidated information of the parent companies a few
years before when the IFRS became compulsory for European corporate groups. So,
this research concludes that regulation change is another mechanism of the institu-
tional theory that has an influence on the reporting behaviour of companies.
Control by a parent company implies another institutional factor: when the parent
company ‘recommends’ how environmental information must be reported by its sub-
sidiaries, becoming a coercive mechanism. In addition, from the subsidiary’s point of
view, the reporting behaviour of the controlling company can be considered as
a reference to imitate, becoming a mimetic institutional factor. Initially, results show
that there is no pattern that concludes that subsidiary concessionaires imitate the
reporting procedures of their parent companies. But, in the last two years (2013,
2014), the parent company sets the disclosure of subsidiaries, what can be due to the
concentration of individual companies under big parent companies. In addition, from
2008 to 2012, results show that there is some influence of parent companies on the
disclosure of subsidiaries. Statistical analysis also shows that auditing firms are an
institutional factor that affects the environmental disclosure of toll road concessionaires,
but only during the second half of the period of analysis.
The coercive or mimetic behaviour that arises from belonging to a sub-sector (with
common features such as industrial sector or ownership) may be due to the objective of
mimicking the behaviour of the best or adapting to what society expects. Accordingly,
some authors find significant differences between industry sectors or between envir-
onmentally sensitive or non-sensitive companies (Aranguren, 2016; Campbell, 2004;
García Sánchez et al., 2013). Thus, to belong to any of the two sub-sectors analysed (real
toll and shadow toll roads) bring us to differentiate behaviours due to different manage-
ment performance or date that concessionaires started to operate.
Nevertheless, results show that coercive mechanisms only have a significant influence
on environmental disclosure in some situations. The type of concession and, to some
extent, the change of regulation and the auditing firm are determining factors. As
Bebbington et al. (2012) state, it is possible that there is a lack of a normativity process
open to dialogue with stakeholders that allows reaching the objective that such
a regulation is accepted and applied by reporting entities.
The low level of environmental information disclosed may be consequence of the
lack of an appropriate internal environmental reporting system in companies and the
need to adapt management and accounting systems to the reporting context (Criado
et al., 2008). Environmental issues may affect companies in a variety of ways and
require a reporting system to enable financial statement preparers to take their impacts
into account. An effective and reliable internal reporting system should be designed to
identify both environmental systematic issues coming from government regulation and
related to the regular business process and non-systematic issues involving casual and
non-financial events (ICAEW, 2009). Companies can also ensure the disclosure of
environmental issues by improving communication between those responsible for
environmental issues and the accounting staff or by seeking advice from specialists
that provide guidance on the information to disclose. The lack of environmental
knowledge in top managers and the department that prepares the financial statements
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(PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), 2004) is another factor that leads to neglecting envir-
onmental aspects.
However, not only organisational reasons explain the low level of environmental
information disclosed; there are also technical accounting reasons. Certain accounting
principles that are used in normal company activities will not be relevant for the
treatment and disclosure of environmental issues in financial statements.
Traditionally, financial statements are prepared from a financial perspective, but envir-
onmental issues introduce a different point of view, so these items do not always fit the
accounting prerequisites of materiality/relevance and usefulness. The information pro-
vided in financial statements must comply with the overall objective of being useful for
the decision-making needs of users, as is stated in the Framework for the Preparation
and Presentation of Financial Statements of the International Accounting Standards
Board. In this accounting framework, relevance is among the principal characteristics
that make the information provided in financial statements useful to users. The
materiality of the information provides a cut-off point for it to be considered as relevant
and, thus, to be included in financial statements. Materiality depends on the nature and
monetary amount of the item. So, the great differences observed between legal require-
ments and items reported may be due to the lack of materiality of environmental items,
in terms of their qualitative or quantitative features. As previously introduced, an
example is what entities alleged in the notes to the financial statements for not
presenting information about environmental obligations, expenses, assets, liabilities or
contingencies: they are not material.
The low scores of concessionaires are the result of the fact that legislation does not
take into account the specific characteristics of economic sectors and requires the same
reporting obligations for companies that belong to different sectors. Depending on the
nature of a business, environmental information could be important from the point of
view of sustainable performance, but not from the financial point of view, which is the
relevant perspective to consider an item as material. If an environmental issue has
a financial impact it should appear separately in financial statements. But, if its
monetary value is not significant or if it only has an impact from the sustainable
point of view of companies’ activities, it should appear in other statements such as
the management report or a sustainability report.
The activities of companies involve both financial and non-financial aspects and
environmental matters are not an exception. Reporting on environmental issues should
be included in the appropriate financial statement. Countries have not been homo-
geneous when legislating whether this information should be reflected in the manage-
ment report, in the annual accounts or in the notes thereto (Price waterhouse Coopers
(PwC), 2004). In determining the information to include in financial statements, the
relevance and the materiality of the information should be considered (Deegan &
Rankin, 1997; FEE, 2008).
The case of Spanish toll road concessionaires confirms this situation because there is a low
level of disclosure of environmental assets, expenditures, provisions, etc., that are items to be
included in the statement of financial position or in the income statement. But, the environ-
mental information given in the management report does not improve environmental
disclosure, so the lack of interest of the sector in disclosing its environmental performance
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is clear. This is especially serious because the parent companies of Spanish toll rod concessio-
naires are building companies, which conform an environmentally sensitive sector.
7. Conclusions
In order to analyse the extent to which Spanish toll road concessionaires have adopted
accounting reporting standards about environmental issues and the quality of the
information provided, the objective of this paper was threefold.
Firstly, we observe a progressive increase in environmental financial disclosure by
Spanish toll sector corporations as a whole over the first half of the sample period
and a standstill during the second half. At the same time, we find a low level of
environmental information reported by the concessionaires that can be due to the
lack of an open process of normativity that promotes a widespread acceptance of the
new regulation. Nevertheless, the main driver of the increase in disclosures is the
compliance with accounting regulations. They repeat the paragraphs or the relevant
notes to the financial statements year by year, and we can even find the same
paragraphs in financial statements of different concessionaires and individual finan-
cial statements of parent companies. In some of the consolidated financial statements
of parent companies, the creativity for explaining environmental facts is quite high,
while others do not disclose any information, despite being a quite sensitive sector to
environment.
Secondly, we do not observe a direct relationship between individual concessionaires
and parent companies because there is no common pattern between controlled entities and
controlling corporations. Only in a few cases do the concessionaires coincide with their
parent companies in the level of disclosure. In addition, results show an inconclusive
relationship between compulsory and voluntary environmental reporting, because con-
solidated financial statements issued by parent companies follow IFRS, that do not require
environmental issues, and get better scores than individual financial statements under
SGAP that are clear about which environmental issues have to be disclosed.
Comparing real toll roads and shadow toll roads, we observe that the first achieve
higher scores than the second latter. The overall situation was not improved with the
incorporation of shadow toll concessionaires. These were supposed to bring ‘fresh air’
into public infrastructure management, as the underlying philosophy for managing
public infrastructure rests on PPP in which the quality of services should be put before
the economic outcome. The shadow toll sector presents even poorer scores than
traditional public procurement by means of real toll concessionaires and most of
them have been in operation during sufficient years to present an adequate level of
environmental reporting.
Thirdly, as regards the institutional mechanisms that explain environmental reporting
pattern behaviour of the Spanish toll road sector according to the institutional theory’s
framework, we can conclude that: accounting regulation changes, as a coercive mechanism,
and the type of concession, as a cultural-mimetic mechanism, produce significant differ-
ences in the level of disclosure. The auditing firm has only an influence after 2007 and with
respect to the type of owner (public/private) of the concessionaires, the statistical results are
not conclusive. Finally, the parent company does not have a significant influence on
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environmental reporting pattern of subsidiaries the sample period as a whole but, after
2008, its influence grew and, in the last two years, it is statistically significant.
Summarising, the environmental financial reporting of the Spanish toll roads sector
presents a low level of disclosure since this information was required by Spanish legisla-
tion. Despite an initial increase after the specific accounting regulation was issued, there is
a stagnation after IFRS became directly or indirectly compulsory. Individual concessio-
naires do not follow the reporting path of their parent companies. Environmental infor-
mation disclosure does not show a significant change after IFRS were implemented
directly, as consolidated financial statements must be elaborated following their principles,
or indirectly, by means of the SGAP. Based on the institutional theory, statistical tests
conclude that some mechanisms (accounting regulation changes, auditing firms and type
of concession) are confirmed as having an influence on the behaviour of environmental
financial disclosure by the entities of the toll roads sector, but there are other mechanisms
that do not have such an influence (parent company, public/private ownership).
As limitations of this research, we should point out that the results only refer to one sector.
Although it is a well-known sector worldwide, and the years for which there are data available
are not homogeneous for all the companies included in the sample. In addition, there are
some results that are inconclusive which can be issues for future research. For instance, the
analysis of the distinctive characteristics (ownership, age, type of management, value of
investment, etc.) of the two types of concessions (real toll and shadow toll) that give rise to
different environmental reporting behaviours in concessionaires of each sub-sector.
There is still hope that the recent reform of financial statements and related reports
proposed by the European Commission Directives 2013/34/EU and 2014/95/EU, trans-
posed by a royal decree9 but without specifying the terms to be implemented, yet in
Spain, will serve as driving force to place environmental reporting in narrative reports
(non-financial statement within the management report) or ad hoc reports (a separate
corporate environment report). These would be better options to reflect the environ-
mental information of companies than traditional financial statements and to improve
the disclosure of environmental reporting.
Notes
1. In the last three decades, countries have attended to several international meetings and
signed agreements that necessarily must be implemented by corporations: Kyoto Protocol
(1997), Johannesburg Earth Summit (2002), Copenhagen Climate Change Conference
(2009), Paris Agreement (2015).
2. There are eight concessionaires that have entered into bankruptcy proceeding: HENARSA,
ACCESOS, MADRIDSUR, EJEAEROPUERTO, MADRIDLEVANTE, MADRIDTOLEDO,
AUCOSTA, CIRALSA.
3. PPP are long-term contracts which may take the form of the construction or management of
public infrastructure or the provision of services (using public infrastructure facilities) by
a private sector entity to society on behalf of a public sector entity (Grimsey & Lewis, 2002).
4. Instituto de Contabilidad y Auditoría de Cuentas (ICAC) (1998). Orden de 10 de diciembre
de 1998, del Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda, por la que se aprueban las normas de
adaptación del Plan General de Contabilidad a las Sociedades concesionarias de autopistas,
túneles, puentes y otras vías de peaje.
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5. ICAC (2002). Resolución de 25 de marzo de 2002, por la que se aprueban normas para el
reconocimiento, valoración e información de los aspectos medioambientales en las cuentas
anuales.
6. Public-interest entities which are parent undertakings of a large group exceeding on its
balance sheet dates, on a consolidated basis, the criterion of the average number of 500
employees during the financial year.
7. This survey was carried out in Swedish companies and found that only a few of the 25 firms
investigated gave plain and comprehensive environmental information the first year after
legislation came into force.
8. This study about the implementation of the EC Recommendation by companies of member
states confirmed that it took some time before the new legislation about environmental
accounting was understood and followed.
9. Real Decreto – Ley 18/2017, de 24 de noviembre, en materia de información no financiera
y diversidad.
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Appendix
Table A.1. List of real toll concessionaires.
CONCESSIONAIRE
LENGTH
(Km.)
YEAR OPENING TO
TRAFFIC
CONTRACT
LENGTH (years)
HIGHWAY INVESTMENT
(€million)
PARENT
COMPANY
RT01 ACESA 478.3 1969 54 2,685 ABERTIS
RT02 EUROPISTAS 84.3 1971 54 399 SACYR
RT03 IBERPISTAS 69.6 1972 56 526 ABERTIS
RT04 AUMAR 467.6 1974 50 1,862 ABERTIS
RT05 AUDENASA 112.6 1976 56 230 SACYR
RT06 AVASA 294.4 1978 63 1,121 ABERTIS
RT07 AUDASA 218.9 1979 75 1,502 SACYR
RT08 AUCALSA 86.8 1983 75 654 SACYR
RT09 AUTEMA 43.1 1989 50 492 FERROVIAL
RT10 AUCAT 56.3 1992 50 505 ABERTIS
RT11 AUTOESTRADAS 57.8 1997 50 45 SACYR
RT12 AUSOL 102.2 1999 55 721 FERROVIAL
RT13 AUSUR 76.6 2001 50 348 PRALESA
RT14 CASTELLANA 50.8 2002 35 479 ABERTIS
RT15 ACEGA 56.6 2002 75 247 FCC
RT16 AULESA 38 2002 55 114 ABERTIS
RT17 HENARSA 85.5 2003 39 813 ACS
RT18 ACCESOS 91.5 2004 50 259 ABERTIS
RT19 MADRID SUR 99.1 2004 65 1,277 FERROVIAL
RT20 EJE AEROPUERTO 8.8 2005 25 475 OHL
RT21 MADRIDLEVANTE 177 2006 38 535 FERROVIAL
RT22 MADRID TOLEDO 81 2006 38 545 Isolux
+Comsa
RT23 AUCOSTA 114 2007 38 75 FCC
RT24 CIRALSA 53.5 2007 40 448 ACS
Table A.2. List of shadow toll concessionaires.
CONCESSIONAIRE
LENGTH
(Km.)
YEAR
OPENING
TO TRAFFIC
CONTRACT
LENGTH
(years)
HIGHWAY
INVESTMENT
(€million) PARENT COMPANY
ST01 NOROESTE 62.2 2001 25 96.3 SACYR
ST02 PANTANOS 70 2002 25 69.9 GLOBALVÍA-ACS
ST03 TRADOS 14.5 2002 25 190.9 ABERTIS-AXA
ST04 EUROGLOSA 8.3 2002 25 86.7 OHL
ST05 CONCESIONESMADRID 14.2 2002 25 191.5 GLOBALVÍA
ST06 AUMANCHA 52.3 2005 30 123.8 ACS
ST07 AUVISA 74.5 2006 25–30 200.1 ACCIONA-ESPIRITO SANTO
ST08 CAMINO 72 2006 30 354.6 FCC
ST09 PAMASA 43.7 2007 33 117.3 SACYR-Local building co.
ST10 MADRID407 16 2007 30 70.3 Construcciones Sarrión-FCC
ST11 VIASTUR 26.8 2007 30 72.5 SACYR- Local building co.
ST12 IBISAN 17.5 2007 30 75.6 FCC-Local building co.
ST13 ACCESOSIBIZA 7 2008 25 74.9 Local building co.
ST14 LLOBREGAT 40 2008 33 311 FCC-Local building co.
ST15 SANTIAGOBRIÓN 15 2008 30 111.1 ACS-Local building co.
ST16 REUSALCOVER 10.2 2008 33 80 ACS
ST17 PUENTEDELEBRO 5.2 2008 30 57.2 ACCIONA-Local building co.
ST18 TURIA 54 2008 36 161.2 SACYR
ST19 SALNES 17 2008 30 53.6 Local building co.
ST20 ERESMA 113 2008 35 101.8 SACYR
ST21 AUPISA 104.6 2008 35 94 ACS
ST22 BARBANZA 40.1 2008 30 95.7 SACYR
ST23 ARO 27 2008 33 88.3 FCC-Local building co.
ST24 TER 49 2011 33 348 FCC-Local building co.
ST25 PIRINEO 67.3 2012 30 219.3 ACS-Local building co.
ST26 DIAGONAL 67 2012 33 475 ACS
32 B. ACERETE ET AL.
Table A.3. Main features of concessionaires.
REAL TOLL ROADS SHADOW TOLL ROADS
Total Length 3,100 km. 1,100 km.
% Spanish high capacity roads 19% 7.5%
First year toll road opened 1969 2001
Last year toll road opened 2007 2012
Longest contract length 75 years 25 years
Shortest contract length 25 years 54 years
Average contract length 51.5 years 31 years
Longest road 478 km. 113 km.
Shortest road 8.8 km. 5.2 km.
Average length 125 km. 45 km.
Maximum capital value €1,500m €354.6m
Minimum capital value €45m €54m
Average capital value €680m €150m
Total capital value €16,355m €3,920m
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